Hedda Hassel Mørch

• Crowther, Karen & Mørch, Hedda Hassel (2026). The Emergence of Space-time and the Emergence of Consciousness: Could They Be One and the Same?: A Comment on Schneider and Bailey’s ‘Superpsychism’. Journal of Consciousness Studies. ISSN 1355-8250. 33(1), s. 127–146. doi: 10.53765/20512201.33.1.127. Fulltekst i vitenarkiv Vis sammendrag

  In ‘Superpsychism’, Susan Schneider and Mark Bailey (this issue) propose that space-time and ordinary (human-level) consciousness both emerge from a fundamental, non-spatio-temporal level of reality consisting of a network of maximally coherent, zero entropy quantum entanglement relations, termed prototime, which also instantiates a fundamental form of consciousness, termed superconsciousness. We raise some objections to this view, considered as an explanation or reduction of space-time, as an interpretation of quantum mechanics, and as a theory of consciousness, questioning the extent of its explanatory advantages in each of these areas.

• Mørch, Hedda Hassel (2025). Is Phenomenalism Superior to Russellian Panpsychism as a Theory of Consciousness and Matter? Philosophia. ISSN 0048-3893. 53, s. 487–497. doi: 10.1007/s11406-025-00852-7. Fulltekst i vitenarkiv Vis sammendrag

  In Phenomenalism: A Metaphysics of Chance and Experience (2023), Michael Pelczar argues that phenomenalism offers a superior account both of the nature of matter and of the relation between matter and consciousness, compared to traditional, Kantian and structural realism (when it comes to matter) and traditional materialism, traditional dualism and Russellian panpsychism (when it comes to consciousness), mainly because phenomenalism is simpler than these other theories while retaining the same explanatory power. In response, I argue that phenomenalism is not really simpler than other theories, in the main respects that Pelczar considers, and in some further respects he does not consider, it is actually less simple. I will also defend Russellian panpsychism (which like phenomenalism offers a theory of both matter and consciousness) against the charge that unlike phenomenalism, it renders physical objects mind-dependent. Furthermore, phenomenalism lacks an account of mental causation. This puts it at a clear disadvantage relative to Russellian panpsychism especially, considered as a theory of consciousness.

• Mørch, Hedda Hassel (2024). Does Panpsychism Mean That ‘We Are All One’? Journal of Consciousness Studies. ISSN 1355-8250. 31(9-10), s. 88–112. doi: 10.53765/20512201.31.9.088. Fulltekst i vitenarkiv Vis sammendrag

  Panpsychism is the view that all things are associated with consciousness. Panpsychism has a number of significant theoretical implications, with respect to the mind–body problem and other problems in metaphysics. Here I will consider one of its potential practical or ethical implications; specifically, whether, if panpsychism is true, it follows that 'we are all one', in a sense that implies that egoism (understood as bias towards what we normally take to constitute the self or ego) is not only immoral but fundamentally irrational (or imprudent).

• Mørch, Hedda Hassel (2021). Is matter conscious? I Chalmers, David J. (Red.), Philosophy of Mind: Classical and Contemporary Readings (second edition). Oxford University Press. ISSN 9780190085759. Fulltekst i vitenarkiv
• Mørch, Hedda Hassel (2020). The Phenomenal Powers View and the Meta-Problem of Consciousness. Journal of Consciousness Studies. ISSN 1355-8250. 27(5-6), s. 131–142. Fulltekst i vitenarkiv
• Mørch, Hedda Hassel (2019). Is consciousness intrinsic? A problem for the Integrated Information Theory. Journal of Consciousness Studies. ISSN 1355-8250. 26(1-2), s. 133–162. Fulltekst i vitenarkiv
• Mørch, Hedda Hassel (2019). Phenomenal knowledge why: the explanatory knowledge argument against physicalism. I Coleman, Sam (Red.), The Knowledge Argument. Cambridge University Press. ISSN 9781107141995. s. 223–253. doi: 10.1017/9781316494134.012. Fulltekst i vitenarkiv
• Mørch, Hedda Hassel (2019). The argument for panpsychism from experience of causation. I Seager, William E. (Red.), The Routledge Handbook of Panpsychism. Routledge. ISSN 9781138817135. doi: 10.4324/9781315717708-23. Fulltekst i vitenarkiv
• Mørch, Hedda Hassel (2018). Is the Integrated Information Theory of Consciousness Compatible with Russellian Panpsychism? Erkenntnis: An International Journal of Scientific Philosophy. ISSN 0165-0106. s. 1–21. doi: 10.1007/s10670-018-9995-6. Fulltekst i vitenarkiv Vis sammendrag

  The Integrated Information Theory (IIT) is a leading scientific theory of consciousness, which implies a kind of panpsychism. In this paper, I consider whether IIT is compatible with a particular kind of panpsychism, known as Russellian panpsychism, which purports to avoid the main problems of both physicalism and dualism. I will first show that if IIT were compatible with Russellian panpsychism, it would contribute to solving Russellian panpsychism’s combination problem, which threatens to show that the view does not avoid the main problems of physicalism and dualism after all. I then show that the theories are not compatible as they currently stand, in view of what I call the coarse-graining problem. After I explain the coarse-graining problem, I will offer two possible solutions, each involving a small modification of IIT. Given either of these modifications, IIT and Russellian panpsychism may be fully compatible after all, and jointly enable significant progress on the mind–body problem.

• Mørch, Hedda Hassel (2018). The evolutionary argument for phenomenal powers. Philosophical Perspectives. ISSN 1520-8583. 31(1), s. 293–316. doi: 10.1111/phpe.12096. Fulltekst i vitenarkiv
• Mørch, Hedda Hassel (2018). Does Dispositionalism Entail Panpsychism? Topoi. ISSN 0167-7411. s. 1–16. doi: 10.1007/s11245-018-9604-y. Fulltekst i vitenarkiv Vis sammendrag

  According to recent arguments for panpsychism, all (or most) physical properties are dispositional, dispositions require categorical grounds, and the only categorical properties we know are phenomenal properties. Therefore, phenomenal properties can be posited as the categorical grounds of all (or most) physical properties—in order to solve the mind–body problem and/or in order avoid noumenalism about the grounds of the physical world. One challenge to this case comes from dispositionalism, which agrees that all physical properties are dispositional, but denies that dispositions require categorical grounds. In this paper, I propose that this challenge can be met by the claim that the only (fundamentally) dispositional properties we know are phenomenal properties, in particular, phenomenal properties associated with agency, intention and/or motivation. Versions of this claim have been common in the history of philosophy, and have also been supported by a number of contemporary dispositionalists (and other realists about causal powers). I will defend a new and updated version of it. Combined with other premises from the original case for panpsychism—which are not affected by the challenge from dispositionalism—it forms an argument that dispositionalism entails panpsychism.

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• Mørch, Hedda Hassel (2023). Non-physicalist Theories of Consciousness. Cambridge University Press. ISBN 9781009317344. 75 s. Fulltekst i vitenarkiv

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• Tønnessen, Morten; Kroglund, Andrew P. & Mørch, Hedda Hassel (2025). Kan Norge bli et økosentrisk demokrati? Fulltekst i vitenarkiv Vis sammendrag

  Andrew P. Kroglund, forfatter av boka Økotopia Hedda Hassel Mørch, forsker på bevissthetsfilosofi og metafysikk Morten Tønnessen, professor i filosofi ved UiS Programleder: Ingvild Paulsen, freelance journalist

• Tønnessen, Morten; Mørch, Hedda Hassel & Sparby, Terje Stefan (2025). Er alle egentlig bare én person? Samtale med musikkinnslag — KÅKÅ.no. Fulltekst i vitenarkiv Vis sammendrag

  Hedda Hassel Mørch, bevissthetsfilosof og forsker spesielt på panpsykisme Morten Tønnessen, professor i filosofi ved UiS Terje Sparby, filosof og meditasjonsforsker Hans Markus Riisdal, vokalist, låtskriver og produsent i bandet TØFL Programleder er Jostein Gjertsen

• Mørch, Hedda Hassel (2025). Artificial intelligence without artificial consciousness? Biologism, structuralism and functionalism. Fulltekst i vitenarkiv
• Mørch, Hedda Hassel (2025). Panpsychism’s ethical implications: more theoretical than practical? Fulltekst i vitenarkiv
• Mørch, Hedda Hassel (2025). Does panpsychism mean that ‘we are all one’? Fulltekst i vitenarkiv
• Mørch, Hedda Hassel (2025). Keynote: The fusion view of mental combination. Fulltekst i vitenarkiv
• Mørch, Hedda Hassel (2025). Keynote: Alternatives to physicalism. Fulltekst i vitenarkiv
• Mørch, Hedda Hassel (2025). Hva er bevissthet og hvor finner vi det? Panpsykisme som et mulig svar. Fulltekst i vitenarkiv
• Mørch, Hedda Hassel (2025). Er alle egentlig bare en person? Fulltekst i vitenarkiv
• Goodwin, Morten; Mørch, Hedda Hassel; Malthe-Sørenssen, Anders & Inntjore, Hilde (2025). Panelsamtale: Hva gjør KI med høyere utdanning, og hva gjør høyere utdanning med KI? Fulltekst i vitenarkiv
• Mørch, Hedda Hassel (2025). Panelsamtale: Hvorfor bør staten pushe KI? Fulltekst i vitenarkiv
• Mørch, Hedda Hassel; Brodal, Per & Larsen, Ann-Cecilie (2025). Abels tårn: Blir du smartere av mobilspill? [Radio]. Nrk P2. Fulltekst i vitenarkiv
• Mørch, Hedda Hassel; Raklev, Are; Kvellestad, Anders & Melteig, Elina (2025). Kvantefysikken - 100 år og like rar. Fulltekst i vitenarkiv
• Mørch, Hedda Hassel; Raklev, Are & Kvellestad, Anders (2025). Abels tårn: Kvantehistorier. [Radio]. NRK P2. doi: https:/radio.nrk.no/podkast/abels_taarn/l_7de3c2ba-b3ca-4120-a3c2-bab3cad12070. Fulltekst i vitenarkiv
• Mørch, Hedda Hassel (2025). God Is the Universe Itself—Meaning Every Pebble and Atom Is Divine, Controversial Theory Claims. [Journal]. Popular Mechanics. doi: https:/www.popularmechanics.com/science/a65635986/is-the-universe-god-pantheism/. Fulltekst i vitenarkiv Vis sammendrag

  New research suggests the universe is conscious, and that it possesses a sense of purpose.

• Mørch, Hedda Hassel (2025). – Hjemmeksamen er ikke forsvarlig lenger. [Journal]. Minerva. doi: https:/www.minerva.no/chatbot-hedda-hassel-morch-hoyere-utdanning/hjemmeksamen-er-ikke-forsvarlig-lenger/474101. Fulltekst i vitenarkiv Vis sammendrag

  Førsteamanuensis i filosofi Hedda Hassel Mørch slår et slag for skoleeksamener.

• Mørch, Hedda Hassel (2025). Skoleeksamen må gjeninnføres – KI gir oss ikke noe annet valg. doi: https:/www.minerva.no/eksamen-hoyere-utdanning-kunstig-intelligens/skoleeksamen-ma-gjeninnfores-ki-gir-oss-ikke-noe-annet-valg/474076. Fulltekst i vitenarkiv Vis sammendrag

  Bruken av KI på hjemmeoppgaver og -eksamener eksploderer ved universiteter og høgskoler, men de samme institusjonene løper fra sitt kjerneansvar ved ikke å ty til det enkleste og beste botemiddelet – skoleeksamen.

• Mørch, Hedda Hassel (2025). Is Everyone the Same Person? Nautilus. ISSN 2372-1758. Fulltekst i vitenarkiv Vis sammendrag

  The only way to make sense of our self is to expand it.

• Undheim, Vegard; Mørch, Hedda Hassel; Røislien, Jo & Jemterud, Torkild (2025). Abels Tårn: Hvor i hjernen sitter den frie viljen? [Radio]. https://radio.nrk.no/podkast/abels_taarn/sesong/2025/l_94ee1. doi: https:/radio.nrk.no/podkast/abels_taarn/sesong/2025/l_94ee1087-a10c-47ff-ae10-87a10cf7ff50. Fulltekst i vitenarkiv
• Mørch, Hedda Hassel (2024). Subjects within subjects? Why consciousness can't overlap. Fulltekst i vitenarkiv
• Mørch, Hedda Hassel (2024). Filosofiske forviklingar. [Journal]. Dag og tid. Fulltekst i vitenarkiv
• Mørch, Hedda Hassel (2024). Er det egentlig så galt med en mannsdominert kanon? Fulltekst i vitenarkiv
• Mørch, Hedda Hassel (2024). Salong: Den gåtefulle bevisstheten. [Radio]. LittPod. Fulltekst i vitenarkiv
• Mørch, Hedda Hassel (2024). Kvinnelige filosofer er blitt nedvurdert, men også forhindret. Fulltekst i vitenarkiv
• Mørch, Hedda Hassel (2024). Sannhet, bevissthet og simulasjoner. Fulltekst i vitenarkiv
• Mørch, Hedda Hassel (2024). The integrated information theory: science, pseudoscience or metaphysics? Fulltekst i vitenarkiv
• Mørch, Hedda Hassel (2024). Skeptiske panpsykister. [Journal]. Morgenbladet. Fulltekst i vitenarkiv
• Mørch, Hedda Hassel (2024). Kan KI skape? Fulltekst i vitenarkiv
• Mørch, Hedda Hassel (2024). Sannhet, bevissthet og simulasjoner. Fulltekst i vitenarkiv
• Mørch, Hedda Hassel; Bøhn, Einar Duenger & Tønnessen, Morten (2024). Panpsychism – healing the dualism of matter and consciousness. Fulltekst i vitenarkiv
• Mørch, Hedda Hassel (2023). Bevissthet #5. [Radio]. Abels tårn, NRK P2. Fulltekst i vitenarkiv
• Mørch, Hedda Hassel (2023). Den seksuelle revolusjonen og dens motstandere. Minerva. ISSN 0026-4695. 2. Fulltekst i vitenarkiv
• Mørch, Hedda Hassel & Anniken, Fleisje (2023). Ja til kvalitet fremfor kjønn som kriterium i filosofi. Fulltekst i vitenarkiv
• Mørch, Hedda Hassel & Anniken, Fleisje (2023). Vi må ikke overproblematisere mannsdominansen i filosofi. Fulltekst i vitenarkiv
• Mørch, Hedda Hassel (2023). Is Consciousness Part of the Fabric of the Universe? [Journal]. Scientific American. Fulltekst i vitenarkiv
• Mørch, Hedda Hassel (2023). Norsk filosof står midt i intens konflikt om bevissthetsforskning. [Internet]. Morgenbladet. Fulltekst i vitenarkiv
• Mørch, Hedda Hassel (2023). An alternative defense of IIT’s Exclusion postulate. Fulltekst i vitenarkiv
• Mørch, Hedda Hassel (2023). Subjects withing subjects? Why the cosmic mind can’t overlap with mine. Fulltekst i vitenarkiv
• Mørch, Hedda Hassel (2022). "Ånd". [Radio]. Kompass, NRK P2. Fulltekst i vitenarkiv
• Mørch, Hedda Hassel (2020). Kan panpsykisme løse klimakrisen? Morgenbladet. ISSN 0805-3847. s. 30–32. Fulltekst i vitenarkiv
• Mørch, Hedda Hassel (2020). Hva er bevissthet? (paneldebatt). Fulltekst i vitenarkiv
• Mørch, Hedda Hassel (2020). Is the universe conscious? It seems impossible until you do the maths. [Journal]. New Scientist. Fulltekst i vitenarkiv
• Mørch, Hedda Hassel (2020). BBC Free Thinking. [Radio]. BBC. Fulltekst i vitenarkiv
• Mørch, Hedda Hassel (2019). Beyond Physicalism. [Internet]. Scientific American Blog Network. Fulltekst i vitenarkiv
• Mørch, Hedda Hassel (2019). Phenomenal powers: a new response to Hume. Fulltekst i vitenarkiv
• Mørch, Hedda Hassel (2019). Can IIT’s axioms be subject to disagreement? Response to Tim Bayne: "On the axiomatic foundations of the Integrated Information Theory of consciousness". Fulltekst i vitenarkiv
• Mørch, Hedda Hassel (2019). Comments on Zach Blaesi: "The moral parody argument against panpsychism". Fulltekst i vitenarkiv
• Mørch, Hedda Hassel (2019). Phenomenal Powers. Fulltekst i vitenarkiv
• Mørch, Hedda Hassel (2019). Phenomenal powers. Fulltekst i vitenarkiv
• Mørch, Hedda Hassel (2019). Is everything conscious? The case for panpsychism. Fulltekst i vitenarkiv
• Mørch, Hedda Hassel (2018). The idea that everything from spoons to stones are conscious is gaining academic credibility. [Internet]. Quartz magazine. Fulltekst i vitenarkiv
• Mørch, Hedda Hassel (2018). Emergent panpsychism or dualism? Fulltekst i vitenarkiv
• Mørch, Hedda Hassel (2018). The Panpsycast, episode 47: Hedda Hassel Mørch on consciousness and integrated information theory (part 2). [Radio]. The Panpsycast. Fulltekst i vitenarkiv
• Mørch, Hedda Hassel (2018). The Panpsycast, episode 47: Hedda Hassel Mørch on consciousness and integrated information theory (part 1). [Radio]. The Panpsycast. Fulltekst i vitenarkiv
• Mørch, Hedda Hassel (2018). Wie kommt der Geist in die Natur? Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung. ISSN 0174-4909. s. 64–65. Fulltekst i vitenarkiv
• Mørch, Hedda Hassel (2017). A Theory of Reality as More Than the Sum of Its Parts. [Journal]. Quanta Magazine. Fulltekst i vitenarkiv
• Mørch, Hedda Hassel (2017). The Integrated Information Theory of Consciousness. Philosophy Now. ISSN 0961-5970. 121. Fulltekst i vitenarkiv
• Mørch, Hedda Hassel (2017). Is Matter Conscious? Nautilus. ISSN 2372-1758. 2. Fulltekst i vitenarkiv
• Mørch, Hedda Hassel (2017). Rapport fra vitenskapens yttergrense: ditt indre liv. [Journal]. Morgenbladet. Fulltekst i vitenarkiv
• Mørch, Hedda Hassel (2016). Leibniz' monader. Salongen : Nettstedet for filosofi og idéhistorie. Fulltekst i vitenarkiv
• Mørch, Hedda Hassel (2016). Bevidsthedsudvidende. [Journal]. Weekendavisen. Fulltekst i vitenarkiv
• Mørch, Hedda Hassel (2014). Panpsykisme. [Radio]. Verdibørsen NRK P2. Fulltekst i vitenarkiv
• Goff, Philip & Hassel, Hedda (2012). Gerald Vision: Re-Emergence: Locating Conscious Properties in a Material World (Review). Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews. Fulltekst i vitenarkiv
• Mørch, Hedda Hassel (2009). Where Darwinism and Analytic Philosophy Went Wrong: An Interview with Jerry Fodor. [Journal]. Filosofisk supplement. Fulltekst i vitenarkiv
• Mørch, Hedda Hassel (2009). Verden som sjeler i et komputasjonelt system: En tolkning av Leibniz’ monadologi. Filosofisk supplement. ISSN 0809-8220. Fulltekst i vitenarkiv
• Mørch, Hedda Hassel (2014). Panpsychism and Causation: A New Argument and a Solution to the Combination Problem. Universitetet i Oslo. Fulltekst i vitenarkiv

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