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Kåre Letrud
Associate Professor
Head of the Norwegian Civil Service Union at INN
- Email
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kare.letrud@inn.no
- Phone number
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+47 61 28 81 04
Inland School of Business and Social Sciences
Department of Law, Philosophy and International studies
Campus Lillehammer
Short description
I have a Dr. Philos. in philosophy from the University of Bergen. In my doctoral thesis I sought to explicate a scientific myth concept, and to explore how such myths spread in the literature and persist despite being repeatedly discredited.
My main research interests are philosophy of science and metaresearch, and I use philosophical analysis as well as empirical methods. I am currently working on the following projects:
1) How will contrasting science with pseudoscience help us understand what science is?
2) By what criteria should we assess the quality of scientific journals?
3) Should philosophy journals require Declarations of Conflicting Interests?
I am open for collaborations in various areas of metaresearch, particularly innovations to improve aspects of academic publishing.
PhilPeople profile
Researchgate profile
Publications
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Letrud, Kåre & Johnsen, Svein Åge Kjøs
(2025).
The pseudoscience case consensus: an agreement in name only?
Philosophical Psychology.
ISSN 0951-5089.
doi:
10.1080/09515089.2025.2473947.
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Efforts at demarcating pseudoscience from science have in the last four decades been fueled by claims of a substantial extensional consensus. Most philosophers, as well as scientists, reportedly have a knack for recognizing pseudoscience, and they agree on what counts as cases of pseudoscience. It is also believed that this extensional consensus will facilitate an intensional consensus on the defining criteria of pseudoscience. The extensional consensus, however, is undocumented, as is the existence of an acute pseudoscience perceptiveness. In this paper, we survey PhD-holding philosophers to assess whether there is consensus on what are examples of paradigmatic pseudosciences. While we do record an initial agreement on examples that can be called “pseudoscientific”, we find no agreement that any of these are paradigmatic. Furthermore, philosophers with a PhD do not categorize pseudosciences markedly differently from respondents with lower or no degrees, suggesting that philosophers are no better at identifying pseudosciences than others. If these findings are correct, addressing the demarcation between science and nonscience via the pseudoscience – science divide will offer no clear advantage for solving the demarcation problem.
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Letrud, Kåre
(2023).
Incorrigible science and doctrinal pseudoscience.
International Studies in the Philosophy of Science.
ISSN 0269-8595.
35(3-4).
doi:
10.1080/02698595.2023.2218264.
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I respond to Sven Ove Hansson’s [2020. "Disciplines, Doctrines, and Deviant Science." International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 33 (1): 43-52. doi:10.1080/02698595.2020.1831258] discussion note on my (Letrud 2019) critique of his (2013) pseudoscience definition. My critique addressed what I considered to be issues with his choice of definiendum, the efficiency of the definition for debunking pseudoscience, and a problematic extensional overlap with bad science. I attempted to solve these issues by proposing some modifications to his definition. I shall address the four main points of the discussion: whether the primary definiendum ought to be ‘pseudoscience’ or ‘pseudoscientific statement’ (I make a moderate case for ‘pseudoscience’), whether ‘discipline’ is an apt category for the definiens (it is, extensionally), and how to go about debunking pseudoscience (it is complicated). And, perhaps most importantly, whether Hansson’s definition of pseudoscientific statement subsumes examples of bad science, and thus science. I present a case study of efforts at correcting unreliable models proliferating in the research literature. This case demonstrates how bad science can satisfy Hansson’s criteria for pseudoscientific statement, including the criterion of deviant doctrine.
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Letrud, Kåre
(2022).
Do we Know it When we See it? A Review of 'Pseudoscience' Patterns of Usage.
Episteme: A journal of individual and social epistemology.
ISSN 1742-3600.
20(2),
p. 479–496.
doi:
10.1017/epi.2022.17.
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Definitions of ‘pseudoscience’ are required to heed the established usage of the definiendum by subsuming those cases that are generally considered to be pseudoscientific, and by excluding those that are considered sciences. In this paper I sample the published record to assess the consensus on pseudoscience case classifications. The review finds inconclusive evidence for an overall agreement. However, the frequent usage of a small number of pseudoscience-cases indicates that these are considered paradigms of pseudoscience. I briefly discuss some practical implications of these findings for the pseudoscience demarcation project.
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Letrud, Kåre & Hernes, Sigbjørn
(2019).
Affirmative citation bias in scientific myth debunking: A three-in-one case study.
PLOS ONE.
14(9),
p. 1–8.
doi:
10.1371/journal.pone.0222213.
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Several uncorroborated, false, or misinterpreted conceptions have for years been widely distributed in academic publications, thus becoming scientific myths. How can such misconceptions persist and proliferate within the inimical environment of academic criticism? Examining 613 articles we demonstrate that the reception of three myth-exposing publications is skewed by an ‘affirmative citation bias’: The vast majority of articles citing the critical article will affirm the idea criticized. 468 affirmed the myth, 105 were neutral, while 40 took a negative stance. Once misconceptions proliferate wide and long enough, criticizing them not only becomes increasingly difficult, efforts may even contribute to the continued spreading of the myths.
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Letrud, Kåre
(2019).
The Gordian Knot of Demarcation: Tying Up Some Loose Ends.
International Studies in the Philosophy of Science.
ISSN 0269-8595.
32(1),
p. 3–11.
doi:
10.1080/02698595.2019.1618031.
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In this article, I seek to improve upon a definition of pseudoscience put forward by Sven Ove Hansson. I argue that not only does its use of ‘pseudoscientific statement’ as definiendum inadequately address the theoretical issue of demarcation, it also makes the definition inapt for practical demarcation. Moreover, I argue that Hanson’s definition subsumes statements and associated practices that are forms of bad science, resulting in an unfavourably wide concept. I try to save the definition from the brunt of this critique by arguing that some pseudoscientific statements are particularly significant when demarcating a discipline as a pseudoscience.
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Letrud, Kåre & Hernes, Sigbjørn
(2018).
Excavating the origins of the learning pyramid myths.
Cogent Education.
5(1),
p. 1–17.
doi:
10.1080/2331186X.2018.1518638.
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The family of cognitive models sometimes referred to as the “Learning Pyramid” enjoys a considerable level of authority within several areas of educational studies, despite that nobody knows how they originated or whether they were supported by any empirical evidence. This article investigates the early history of these models. Through comprehensive searches in digital libraries, we have found that versions of the Learning Pyramids have been part of educational debates and practices for more than 160 years. These findings demonstrate that the models did not originate from empirical research. We also argue that the contemporary Learning Pyramids, despite their continued modifications and modernizations, have failed to keep up with the developments of cognitive psychology. The conception of memory implied by the Learning Pyramids deviates significantly from the standard picture of human memory.
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Letrud, Kåre & Hernes, Sigbjørn
(2015).
The diffusion of the learning pyramid myths in academia: an exploratory study.
Journal of Curriculum Studies.
ISSN 0022-0272.
48(3),
p. 291–302.
doi:
10.1080/00220272.2015.1088063.
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This article examines the diffusion and present day status of a family of unsubstantiated learning-retention myths, some of which are referred to as ‘the learning pyramid’. We demonstrate through an extensive search in academic journals and field-specific encyclopaedias that these myths are indeed widely publicised in academia and that they have gained a considerable level of authority. We also argue that the academic publishing of these myths is potentially harmful to both professional as well as political deliberations on educational issues, and therefore should be criticized and counteracted.
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Letrud, Kåre
(2012).
A rebuttal of NTL institute's learning pyramid.
Education.
ISSN 0013-1172.
133(1),
p. 117–124.
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This article discusses the learning pyramid propagated by National Training Laboratories Institute. It presents and complements the historical and methodological critique against the learning pyramid, and calls for NTL Institute to retract their model.
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Hernes, Sigbjørn & Letrud, Kåre
(2009).
Læringspyramiden : en undersøkelse av opphav, utbredelse og gyldighet.
Uniped - Tidsskrift for universitets- og høgskolepedagogikk.
ISSN 1500-4538.
32(2),
p. 30–43.
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Læringspyramiden har forekommet i norske pedagogiske tekster i godt over 30 år, men modellens opphav og empiri er skyggelagt. Videre er det ingen enighet om hvordan modellen ser ut, hvilke læringsformer den omfatter, og hvilken læringseffekt disse gir. Ut fra disse forholdene, og fra generelle innvendinger til modellens kategorier, anbefaler vi at man heretter avstår fra å bruke den. Vi skriver også om hvilken utbredelse og status modellen har innenfor norsk pedagogikk, og hvordan den har kunnet spre seg.
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Letrud, Kåre
(2003).
Det arkaiske individ.
Arr - Idéhistorisk tidsskrift.
ISSN 0802-7005.
15(2),
p. 86–90.
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Vi tar det for gitt å tenke på oss selv som individer. De fleste av oss mener vi har en fri vilje, at handlingene våre ikke styres av ytre årsaker. Vår vilje lar oss treffe valg, og disse valgene står vi så til ansvar for. Som individer eier vi en viss kompleksitet, vi trekkes mellom ulike og ofte uforenelige motiver og drifter.
Bruno Snell har i The Discovery of the Mind vist hvordan utviklingen av denne forståelsen av individet kommer til uttrykk i antikken språk, poesi, kunst og filosofi. I de tidligste kildene finner vi i følge Snell ikke tegn til en slik forståelse av mennesket. Homers helter kjenner verken tvil eller ansvar, de drives av krefter utenfra, ikke av et reflektert indre. Grunnen er, hevder Snell, at personene i Homers univers er uten intellektuell og følelsesmessig dybde. Homer mangler begreper og forestillinger om individualitet, om intellekt, og vilje, og dette utvikles først gjennom antikken.
Jeg skal i det følgende forsøke å modifisere den omveltningen i tenkemåte Snell mener karakteriserer antikken, ved å vise at Homers arkasite individforståelse ligger nærmere vår egen.
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Letrud, Kåre
(1997).
Den sokratiske erobringskunst.
Parabel : Tidsskrift for filosofi og vitenskapsteori.
ISSN 0808-1514.
1(1),
p. 81–84.
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Sokrates, slik han fremstilles i Platons dialoger, er en mangetydig figur. De stadige hentydninger til filosofiens kjærlighetsnatur innbyr til en, om enn uhøytidlig, lesning av denne filosofien som en elsker. Dertil hører en noe annerledes tolkning av dialogen, jordmorkunsten, dialektikken og driften mot det skjønne. Sokrates inntar en posisjon i dialektikken som er ensidig negativ, men som vi etterhvert skal se er ikke negasjonen et middel til å forløse erkjennelse, men en måte å imponere ynglingene på. Møtet mellom den aldrende erotiker og hans samtalepartnere kan sees som et bilde på forførelse. Det er ikke i en positiv forstand, som en flørtende lek mellom jevnbyrdige, men en akt på grensen av utnytting. Den eldre og mer erfarne Sokrates gir ikke, men bare tar. Slik sett er det en enveis kommunikasjon, hvor Sokrates' partner er den eneste som yter noe. Sokrates' interesse virker ekte og oppmuntrer til intimitet og åpenhjertighet. Først etterpå ser den andre at den var tilgjort, og til og med preget av forakt.
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Letrud, Kåre; Nordby, Halvor & Veggeland, Frode
(2026).
Leder du et universitet, bør du ha erfaring fra forskning og undervisning.
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Hvorfor det er nødvendig at styreledere i UH-sektoren har sektorkunnskap.
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Letrud, Kåre
(2022).
Hvis du leger med ild, så tisser du i sengen: en Google Trends-søgning.
Ugeskrift for Læger.
ISSN 0041-5782.
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Formålet med denne artikel er at vurdere, om eksponering for ild kan forårsage sengevædning. Hvis der er en sådan sammenhæng, bør det kunne ses som spidser i søgeinteressen for sengevædning dagen efter bålaftener. Søgeresultater i Google Trends viser imidlertid ingen sammenhæng mellem bålaftener og øget søgeinteresse for sengevædning. Jeg konkluderer, at eksponering for ild ikke ser ud til at forårsage sengevædning.
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Letrud, Kåre
(2022).
Pseudo-Platon: Leptodermos.
Norsk pedagogisk tidsskrift.
ISSN 0029-2052.
106(1),
p. 79–85.
doi:
10.18261/npt.106.1.8.
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Oversetterens kommentar: Jeg kom over dette manuskriptet på et loppemarked, gjemt innimellom sidene i et kassert bibliotekeksemplar av Aristoteles’ «Om komedien». Teksten var håndskrevet på attisk gresk, og viste seg å være en dialog mellom Sokrates og den unge mannen Leptodermos om begrepet krenkelse. Dialogen er lagt til en av dagene før rettssaken mot Sokrates. Stilistisk og tematisk minner den om Platons tidlige verker, men det forekommer ingen referanser til denne dialogen i de andre verkene hans, og karakteren Leptodermos finner jeg ikke omtalt andre steder. Jeg velger likevel å gjøre denne oversettelsen tilgjengelig da krenkelse er aktuelt også i våre dager.
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Letrud, Kåre & Wilkinson, David
(2020).
Scientific Myths Endure, Even In The Minds Of Some Scientists.
[Internet].
https://www.oxford-review.com/scientific-myths/#.
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Letrud, Kåre & Wagner, Sophia
(2020).
Mythen der Wissenschaft: Der Hawthorne-Effekt wird oft falsch zitiert.
[Radio].
Deutschlandfunk/Forschung Aktuell.
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Letrud, Kåre
(2019).
Debunk or bust! Sometimes the debunking of scientific myth backfires, and contributes to the continued spreading of the myth instead.
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Letrud, Kåre & Brock, Jon
(2019).
Careless citations don't just spread scientific myths – they can make them stronger.
[Internet].
https://www.natureindex.com.
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Moe, Erlend; Letrud, Kåre & Hernes, Sigbjørn
(2019).
Vil ta livet av myter og tvilsomme teorier i forskningen.
[Internet].
Forskning.no.
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Letrud, Kåre & Hernes, Sigbjørn
(2018).
Affirmative citation distortion in scientific myth debunking: a three-in-one case study.
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Skaare, Sigrun Dancke; Hernes, Sigbjørn & Letrud, Kåre
(2018).
Læringspyramiden: en utbredt og seiglivet vitenskapelig myte.
[Internet].
https://forskning.no/pedagogikk-partner-skole-og-utdanning/l.
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Grønli, Kristin Straumsheim & Letrud, Kåre
(2015).
Hviskeleken: Det du tror du vet kan være en akademisk vandrehistorie.
[Journal].
Forskerforum.
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Skaare, Sigrun Dancke; Hernes, Sigbjørn & Letrud, Kåre
(2009).
Vil forkaste læringspyramiden.
Forskning.no.
ISSN 1891-635X.
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Læringspyramiden bør legges til hvile en gang for alle! Dette er konklusjonen etter en nylig gjennomgang av modellens opphav.
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Letrud, Kåre
(2020).
Acquiesced and unrefuted : The growth of scientific myths.
Universitetet i Bergen.
ISSN 9788230863640.
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This thesis explores the phenomenon of scientific myths distributed in academic discourses. Drawing on a set of myth-examples, I explicate a definition of the term ‘scientific myth’, arguing that it ought primarily to be characterised by the tension between a lack of epistemic warrant on the one hand, and an extensive proliferation in formal academic channels of publications on the other. I then delineate scientific myths from the closely associated pseudosciences: The sciences, although distributing some unreliable statements, do not bestow upon such statements the same authority and importance as the pseudosciences do. From these demarcative deliberations, I proceed to address the question of myth diffusion, of how misconceptions grow to scientific myths. Discussing myth-propagation, I argue that a fundamental explanation for myth-spreading is deficient epistemic practices. Omissions of citations, although a both common and pertinent explanation, only account for some aspects of myth spreading. In the context of research debates, the issue of myth diffusion also includes efforts at debunking scientific myths in academic publications. Our findings indicate that there is an ‘Affirmative Citation Bias’, that counteracts debunking attempts by effectively disarming the critique: Instead of being distributed, the critique is buried in an avalanche of myth-affirming publications. Finally, I discuss whether scientific myths ought to be somewhat vindicated. They could conceivably have an anti-dogmatic function in academic debates, by representing alternatives to the established consensus, in accordance with Millsian and Feyerabendian ideals for truth seeking discourse. I conclude in the negative: Scientific myths have dogmatic aspects themselves.
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Addresses
Postal Address
University of Inland Norway
Postboks 400 Vestad
2418 Elverum
Norway